Harriet Hardy, protégé of Alice Hamilton, spent 1948 in the Health Division of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. The contemporary campaign for federal legislation to compensate nuclear workers brought to the fore living retirees in whose cases of occupational illness Hardy had a role in diagnosis or case management. A third case is documented in archival records. Methods of participatory action research were used to better document the cases and strategize in light of the evidence, thereby assisting the workers with compensation claims. Medical and neuropsychological exams of the mercury case were conducted. Hardy's diary entries and memoirs were interpreted in light of medicolegal documentation and workers' recollections. Through these participatory research activities, Harriet Hardy's role and influence both inside and outside the atomic weapons complex have been elucidated. An important lesson learned is the ongoing need for a system of protective medical evaluations for nuclear workers with complex chemical exposures.
Dr. Harriet Hardy spent 1948 at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in the Occupational Health Group and continued to consult for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) during her later academic career. Alice Hamilton, her collaborator and mentor, has been the focus of extensive biographical research, but Harriet Hardy has attracted little scholarly attention. Credited with discovering beryllium disease in the Americas at 39 years old, Hardy presented her original findings for workers in the Salem fluorescent lamp industry to the Massachusetts Medical Society in May 1946 [1] , and later became the first woman named a full professor at Harvard Medical School. She had longstanding affiliations with Massachusetts state government and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Hardy died at the age of 87 in 1993 [2] .
Two living Los Alamos retirees in whose cases of occupational illness Hardy played a pivotal role in diagnosis or case management came to the fore at field hearings of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) during the contemporary campaign for the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPAct). The Los Alamos hearing in March 2000, attended by an overflow crowd, was held in Espanola, NM, home to many of the Lab's blue-collar workers [3] . A private meeting between the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environment, Safety and Health and Los Alamos workers' families took place in a meeting room at one of the nearby Pueblo Indian casinos. Both meetings were held "off the Hill," at safe remove from the town of Los Alamos, where facility managers reside [4] , to avoid fear of retaliation among workers for speaking out [5] .
Two retired LANL 1 workers recounted the role that Hardy had played in their respective cases. One had chronic beryllium disease (CBD); the other was the index case of a series of mercury poisonings. Coincidentally, the CBD case (initials WVB) had worked with another machinist whose acute berylliosis was extensively documented in an archival collection at the University of Tennessee [6] . WVB was unaware that his co-worker (initials JDJ), presumed deceased, had also developed beryllium disease.
Over the next six years, participatory action research was conducted to strengthen the workers' claims for compensation under the new federal law [7] . Doing so has elucidated a little-known chapter in the career of Harriet Hardy, a leading figure in occupational medicine in America.
These investigations illustrate the importance of collaboration among university researchers, community members, and clinical specialists. Medicolegal histories of the cases, along with Hardy's memoirs [8] and diary entries [9], reveal the barriers and opportunities this leader in occupational health faced early in her career. Institutions of civil society-such as a state medical society, journalists, and an industrial union movement-that facilitated her investigation of the fluorescent lamp industry were largely absent from the secretive, isolated atomic community of Los Alamos. At some personal sacrifice, Hardy combined her cutting-edge knowledge of industrial toxicology with concern for individual patients to advocate at Los Alamos for a precautious approach, emphasizing workplace controls and sound medicolegal decisions.
Methods included: referral to occupational specialists intrigued by Hardy's involvement; collaboration with a congressional district office in making requests for medical records; and living room meetings to strategize in light of the evidence. DOE's online OpenNet database and Hardy's papers archived at Radcliffe's Schlesinger Library were fruitfully searched. A documents discovery project of the Centers for Disease Control, focusing on past emissions from Los Alamos [10] , invited a strategy combining public history and public health to foster stakeholder participation. The mercury case (initials ALS) underwent a comprehensive occupational medical evaluation, including a battery of neuropsychological tests, with an eye toward late sequelae of mercury exposure.
CAMPUS-COMMUNITY INVESTIGATION

Acute Berylliosis in a Co-Worker Machinist on the Manhattan Project
The archived papers of Alexander Hollaender, an early American scientist in radiation mutagenesis, yielded an extensive file on one of the first recognized cases of berylliosis in the Manhattan Project (initials JDJ). Twenty-four years old and from Denver, JDJ joined the Los Alamos machine shop in 1943. He had previously worked at the Berkeley cyclotron. Duties at Los Alamos included tool and die making, metal forming, and spinning.
In October 1945 JDJ suffered what appeared to be recurring lung infections. Short of breath and producing bloody sputum, he showed no improvement in response to penicillin and oxygen. X-rays "were suggestive of a diffuse pulmonary fibrosis." A memorandum penned by Los Alamos physicians on August 1, 1946, just three months after Harriet Hardy's landmark presentation before the Massachusetts Medical Society, is incisive:
The patient stated that he had worked with beryllium oxide and metallic beryllium to some extent prior to his symptoms. In addition, he worked for [a] much longer period in the same shop where these materials were being tooled by other workers [11] .
The amount of time he had spent working with beryllium was estimated to be 300 hours. He continued to work in late 1946 despite abnormal X-rays.
By January 1947 JDJ's claim for workers' compensation benefits was awarded by the Department of Insurance and Retirement Systems of the University of California, the contractor operating Los Alamos for the federal government. "[D]isability based on a lung ailment presumably caused by the inhaling of beryllium oxide" was rated at 56.25 percent and considered "permanent." He was awarded up to 225 weekly payments of $25, along with "further medical care and treatment" [12] .
On the eve of these workers' compensation proceedings, and anticipating increasing amounts of beryllium work, the Lab's doctors began to learn more about this toxic metal. On December 31, 1946, Dr. Cleve Beller of the Los Alamos Occupational Health Group (known as H-2) addressed a memorandum to Dr. Louis Hempelmann, the leader of the Health Division, who in the coming year would recruit Harriet Hardy to Los Alamos. "There will soon be approximately 10 people handling the oxide of beryllium here," Beller wrote, proposing a program of prevention, research, and medical surveillance to include lung function tests and chest X-rays [13] .
JDJ's second medicolegal proceeding involved the Los Alamos "welfare fund" for atomic workers, which provided supplemental compensation for those who had not been informed that they were exposed to toxic substances. The transcript of a medical panel in Los Angeles in January 1949 provides a detailed account [14] . Stafford Warren, the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) medical professor whose AEC-funded career would lead to prominence in the field of radiobiology, presided. Harriet Hardy flew in from Massachusetts to attend. She had earlier examined JDJ in his home. JDJ's physician was the third voting member. The panelists addressed three principal issues: whether JDJ was informed of the beryllium hazard; the percent and permanence of his disability; and other possible causes.
The worker's state of knowledge engendered little debate. "Beryllium wasn't considered that potent," Hardy noted. Referring to federal safety officials, "They thought Beryllium was no worse than bicarbonate of soda." Discussion of other possible causal agents put the unique expertise of Harriet Hardy on display. The wide array of other materials to which LANL machinists were exposedincluding tungsten carbide, cobalt, lead, and cadmium-were terra incognita for the other physician panelists. Hardy described JDJ's berylliosis as "too classical to be anything else." In 1949 beryllium disease was novel. Only one who had read the world medical literature, as Harriet Hardy had done during her investigation of the fluorescent lamp industry, could recognize its "classical" presentation.
More vexatious was the permanence of disability. Other than Hardy, none of the physicians had ever participated in the diagnosis or management of a case of beryllium disease. Expectations varied markedly. "It may all be in his head," opined one of the UCLA physician advisors to the panel, citing symptoms that varied with climate and altitude. In rebuttal Hardy pointed out "[H]e had to sleep in a chair" while in Denver. The worker's personal physician believed JDJ was approaching permanent disability and likely to die in five years.
However, Hardy demurred based on her experience with the Salem cases, some of whom had reversed course. She stated that "he is going to go downhill" and "this could possibly be permanent," but she refused to put a time frame on it.
The panel's deliberations were hamstrung by missing X-rays that would have allowed the physicians to judge the progression of lung disease along a time continuum. The administrator of the welfare fund sought to explain why X-rays from Los Alamos were not in hand: "I think they were forwarded to the [AEC] Legal Division, Washington. I think they got there and were never sent back."
In 1950 JDJ moved to reopen the state compensation claim on grounds of total disability. Robert Grier, a Los Alamos Lab physician, traveled to Long Beach, California and "talked a little to Mr.
[JDJ] after the hearing," then paid a visit to the worker's personal physician. In an internal memo, Grier predicted "that in a matter of a few years it will become progressive and that [JDJ] will be totally disabled." But the Los Alamos doctor requested "all persons who may have access to this memorandum keep the information in strict confidence and especially not in any way intimate or divulge to Mr.
[JDJ] my comments on the ultimate prognosis" [15] .
Notes of a May 1960 phone call from Dr. Hardy to Dr. Warren, who had risen to dean of the UCLA School of Medicine, indicate that JDJ was "alive, living near Palm Springs," married and working as an inspector and "has done well on steroids" [16] .
Chronic Beryllium Disease in a Manhattan Project Machinist
At age 19 WVB joined the Los Alamos machine shop-in 1943, within four months of JDJ. In 2004, upon being presented with the archival file described above, WVB reminisced about an outdoor picnic with JDJ and their young wives in the mountains near Los Alamos during the war years. But WVB never knew that his co-worker had left because of berylliosis, nearly 25 years before his own diagnosis.
At the time of WVB's medicolegal proceedings under New Mexico workers' compensation law, Hardy, then a medical consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission, argued against the need for open lung biopsy to prove a diagnosis of berylliosis. Her 1970 diagnosis rested mainly on WVB's lung function tests and occupational history [17] . But to satisfy standards of proof under state law, on legal advice WVB submitted to the procedure which entailed the surgical breaking of two ribs to access the lungs (see photo). A specialist at Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque, which has a long history of contractual relationships with federal weapons and military institutions, wrote to WVB: "A chemical assay of the lung is the only way we will know whether the exposure to beryllium in the past has caused the lung changes and the change in your lung function" [18] . Biopsied tissue was sent to a government laboratory for X-ray dispersive analysis, confirming the presence of beryllium in granulomatous lung lesions.
By November 1971 the workers' compensation insurer for Los Alamos had taken the position that the statute of limitations under the state law had expired. WVB's attorney asked for a waiver, to no avail. So a suit was filed in state court. As part of pre-hearing discovery, the attorney sought to have WVB's chest X-rays from his decades of physical examinations at the Lab provided to the Lovelace doctor for review. The Lab resisted, but the X-rays were finally obtained under a subpoena.
The machinist recalls being told by the Lovelace doctor that his X-rays showed evidence of fibrotic changes as early as 1962, eight years before the Lab referred him to Lovelace. "I was denied diagnoses and medical treatment because H-2 of LASL either could not or would not tell me that the fibrotic condition was evident on their X-rays of me," he would later write [19] .
By the time state workers' compensation proceedings were well underway in 1973, Dr. George Voelz, who had taken over management of the case for the Los Alamos Health Division, opined that "chronic pulmonary berylliosis appears to be the most probable diagnosis" [20] .
WVB remained employed at the Lab until 1977 [21] . He obtained a settlement of $50,000, $25,000 each for health-related expenses and a lump sum for lost wages.
Mercury in K-Stockroom
At the DOE field hearing in Espanola in 2000, a 73-year-old retiree (initials ALS) recounted how he and three co-workers were diagnosed with varying degrees of mercury poisoning by Hardy in 1948. They were exposed in K-Stockroom, a makeshift chemical storage area that had previously been a horse stable. He testified:
The mercury came in steel flasks, we'd wash it in acetone several times and then they had a hot plate there and we'd put it in a small container and boil it. . . . It was made of glassware, like a whiskey still, and it would come out on the other end in a bottle of pure mercury. . . . It was in one little cubby hole there about eight-by-eight, no ventilation or nothing. No exhaust fans [3].
He described three trips to the Lab infirmary for an allergy-like reaction involving facial erythema and swelling of the lips and eyelids. The Lab physician failed to inquire about his job tasks. On the fourth visit he was seen by Hardy, who was new to Los Alamos Health Division. She accompanied him to the work site. Various effects in the four workers, including pathognomonic oral manifestations (e.g., bleeding gums, blue gingival line, exfoliative periodontitis, excessive salivation) were emphasized by Hardy in a later teaching presentation to local physicians with the workers in attendance.
Psychiatric issues persisted until his retirement in 1982, at which time: "I asked them [the Lab] about it. I'd like to see it on my medical record. They had no record of it whatsoever." Post-retirement, outreach to Hardy through a friend with contacts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was unavailing. So too was a visit to a private attorney; the statute of limitations had long since expired [3] .
In planning follow-up activities to the March 2000 field hearing, an advocate (KS) intrigued by the mercury case conducted an online search of OpenNet [22] . A government database of health-and exposure-related historical documents created in the late 1970s to respond to requests in lawsuits, OpenNet provides online access to the holdings of the DOE's Coordination and Information Center [23] . Six memos retrieved from OpenNet, four of which were authored by Harriet Hardy, provide a fuller picture of the episode of mercury in K-Stockroom. In addition, ALS sent these documents to an environmental technician, also retired, who had authored one of the memos. The technician responded with a five-page letter of detailed recollections and interpretation [24] .
Hardy promptly visited the work area and four days later sent a memo to a supervisor. She opined that the air concentrations were "probably in excess of the maximum allowable concentration." Among the "conservative measures" she stipulated were enclosing the operation, moving it "to a more suitable location," and biweekly medical follow-up of ALS [25] . "I ordered the work stopped," Hardy wrote in her memoir, "and the shed closed while it was being cleaned." This generated "[l]oud complaints from those using mercury" in experimental work around Los Alamos [8] . The dispute reached Lab Director Norris Bradbury, who sided with Hardy in shutting down the operation.
Following up on a tour of Los Alamos records facilities in 2006, a congressman's staff requested "complete" medical records on behalf of several constituents, including ALS. This led to the production of Hardy's initial clinic intake notes from February 19, 1948 ( Figure 1 ). Curiously, this document had been omitted from medical files previously furnished by LANL in response to routine claims-related document requests made prior to congressional intervention. Still missing is the concentration of mercury detected by a urine test ordered by Hardy in 1948. The numerical concentration appears to have been redacted from a document in ALS's medical file (Figure 2 ). In September 2003 neuropsychological testing was conducted by evaluators highly experienced in the neurotoxicology of heavy metals. Among the recommendations was an evaluation by an occupational medicine physician, which took place in May 2005. The findings of these clinical assessments are presented here (see box).
Details of the disposition of each of the three cases discussed in this article are provided in Table 1 .
HARRIET HARDY AND THE WORKERS OF LOS ALAMOS
These three cases would have remained shrouded by the DOE's "culture of secrecy" were it not for the field hearings on the proposed EEOICPAct legislation initiated by the agency in 1999. Tellingly, it was not until a fourth request for records, in follow-up to a congressman's tour of Los Alamos records facilities, that a microfilm image of Hardy's handwritten clinic intake notes from February 1948 was provided to the mercury poisoning claimant (Figure 1 ). Nor had any of the 1948 memos about dangerous mercury exposures been included in the patient record; these were discovered on OpenNet by a contemporary advocate. And while several documents confirm the worker's recollection that a urinalysis for mercury was ordered by Hardy, the results thereof are curiously omitted from records provided to date (Figure 2) . The beryllium cases, adjudicated in whole (JDJ) or in part (WVB) in earlier eras, were disadvantaged by similar degrees of secrecy involving missing and withheld chest X-rays. 
Summary Medical Report for Mercury Index Case (initials ALS)
Occupational Medicine Evaluation. A detailed occupational, social and medical history was taken. The airborne mercury concentrations measured in ALS's work environment in 1948 one month after closure of the distillation unit were an order of magnitude greater than levels now recognized to be associated with objective neurological impacts. In addition, medical records provided by the employer revealed that ALS had elevated urinary lead levels when he worked as a foundry helper at LANL in the early 1950's. The medical and social history revealed personality and cognitive changes occurring immediately after the K-Stockroom mercury episode. Noteworthy were irritability and the patient's inability to concentrate at his subsequent desk job handling procurement of furniture and platinum precious metal. His job was not challenging or difficult for him he stated, but he continued to feel irritability in mood and described himself as irrational in behavior. He stated never having been irritable previously but instead was easy going and able to function without difficulty. His cognitive limitations became most apparent when he tried unsuccessfully c. 1950 to resume his college studies, despite having been valedictorian of his high school class. These symptoms are consistent with neurotoxicant encephalopathy syndrome and the fact that these changes occurred following his exposure to high levels of mercury are chronologically consistent as well. In the years leading up to early retirement at age 55 he experienced unprecedented difficulty reading blueprints and was hospitalized for depression for a brief time. Depression on the job led him to choose early retirement in 1982.
Neuropsychological Assessment. The patient's estimated premorbid intellectual potential was in the above average range. His performance on neuropsychological testing revealed particular strengths in the areas of verbal functioning, where he tended to perform at or above his estimated premorbid potential.
However, notable deficits were observed in several cognitive domains, including attention, motor and memory functioning. In the area of attention, ALS demonstrated impaired visual attention (visual spans backward). With regard to motor function, his performance across tasks was notable for psychomotor slowing, tremulousness and incoordination. Slight motor problems (slurring of individual words) were also noted in his free speech, which was also remarkable for some word finding difficulties.
On memory tasks, he required more time to initially acquire and encode new information than would be expected for his premorbid intellectual potential. Impairments were also noted in his retrieval of newly learned information, although his retention of information over time was generally consistent with his immediate recall.
The pattern of neuropsychological test results suggested frontal/subcortical dysfunction with possible basal ganglia involvement. Possible etiologies for these findings were seen to include mercury and/or lead encephalopathy, cerebrovascular disease, or toxicant-induced hypertension leading to cerebrovascular compromise. The cognitive findings were not explainable on the basis of long-standing depression.
To improve diagnostic specificity of the etiology of cognitive findings, brain MRI (including FLAIR) was recommended. Conducted in August 2006, it revealed no acute intracranial abnormality. Small vessel chronic ischemic disease was evident in a periventricular and brain stem distribution.
for its time-of scientific excellence, persuasive power, public openness, intellectual clarity, and unyielding conviction in advocating for protection of worker health. At Los Alamos, immediately upon presentation of the mercury index case and Hardy taking an occupational history, she visited the worksite, made the diagnosis, and recommended the distillation unit be shut down.
Hardy integrated her cutting-edge knowledge of clinical toxicology with her family upbringing steeped in debate and argumentation. These traits allowed her to provide leadership, both as an insider and as an outsider, for institutions dominated by values of secrecy, denial, and experimental physical science. As a Yankee woman at Los Alamos, she was an outsider, temporarily "in" but never "of" the atomic culture of secrecy. According to her memoirs, Hardy argued at length with Los Alamos classification personnel over excessive secrecy. It is unclear whether she was fighting over the very mercury-related memos discussed in this paper [8] .
No documentation has yet been located on the interactions between Lab Director Norris Bradbury and Hardy in response to "loud protests" from scientists deprived of their aliquots of mercury. What might have transpired can be inferred from a speech given by Dr. Thomas Shipman in 1969. Formerly plant physician at the General Electric River Works facility in Lynn, Massachusetts, Shipman joined Los Alamos in 1949 and rose to become the leader of the Health Division. He remembered Hardy as "a typical Vermonter . . . an unstoppable individual, prepared to shake a long finger under any available nose" [26] .
In a 1975 lecture Director Bradbury did not mention Harriet Hardy or the mercury episode specifically. But he did reflect on the hazards of the We made the first plutonium reactor, called Clementine, and it was the first reactor that operated upon a fast neutron spectrum. I only pause to note that today it would take you ten billion dollars and fifty thousand volumes of environmental reports and nobody'd let you do it anyway, but we just did it [27] .
A woman's interference with experimental and production imperatives could not have earned Hardy many influential allies among male scientists at Los Alamos [28] . Her challenges to persons in authority (with "a long finger") and temporarily impeding the coolant supply of the Clementine project seem remarkable.
As a sign of her alienation, near the end of her year at Los Alamos, in November 1948 Hardy wrote in her diary: I do not feel congenial with the disciplines of physics [and] mathematics. . . .
[T]here is a kind of inelasticity and narrowness to the minds of these menmore from training than the content of their fields; imagination is not part of their equipment . . . the admission of variables is not allowed . . . [9].
On February 22, in between visiting the mercury work area and recommending its shutdown, she admits to her diary to being "homesick." Three weeks later she was "enjoying" social interactions with Louis Hempelmann (the immediate superior who had recruited her) and his wife, but with "reservations I can't define." In her memoir she recalls debating vigorously with Hempelmann over the usefulness of studying the effects of radioactive materials in animal models, which was the ostensible focus of his research program [8] . In fact, animal experimentation was but a small part of his research agenda. Although it was not public knowledge until decades later, Hemplemann was one of the principal practitioners of secretive experimentation with plutonium in human subjects as early as 1945 [29] .
Hardy's proactive, precautious approach stands in contrast to the scientific paradigm which later came to dominate at Los Alamos and other nuclear weapons facilities: radiation dosimetry [30] . Adherents assert the ability to differentiate a harmful dose of a radioactive element from a safe dose by calculating with mathematical models the amount of energy delivered to critical target cells in the body of a particular human being. On the basis of these calculations professional opinions are rendered as to the likelihood of harm incurred by an individual worker, and in some cases the degree of workplace protection required.
The contrast between Hardy's approach and the radiation dosimetry paradigm that came to dominate Los Alamos and other atomic facilities is not simply about differing scientific approaches. Science is socially constructed [31] . By 1948 the culture of Los Alamos was changing rapidly from an assemblage of elite scientists to an authoritarian institution devoted primarily to the design, testing, and manufacture of weapons components [32] . Authoritarianism tends to emphasize scientific orthodoxies. One such orthodoxy is the quest for detection of the toxic agent in the worker's body fluids as a necessary precondition for preventive action. Indeed, adherence to this orthodoxy may have led to many of the egregious human radiation experiments. Hardy rejected this orthodoxy. Her recommendation to shut down the mercury operation came two weeks before the earliest urinalysis data and was based on clinical observations, listening to worker symptoms and concerns, and investigating work conditions.
In the ethical discourse of the broader American medical profession of the early 20th century, a utilitarian calculus based on the balancing of probabilities was challenged by the moral ideas of Dr. Richard Cabot of Harvard [33] . Professional competence, truth-telling, cooperation with other health professions, and humanistic concern for "each sufferer" were touchstones of Cabot's increasingly influential approach to medical ethics. Indeed, Hardy had in common with Cabot a social worker colleague, Ida Cannon, who lent advice "on the human side of industrial illness" at Massachusetts General Hospital immediately before Hardy's year at Los Alamos [8] .
Cold War production imperatives probably contributed to the triumph of the dosimetric approach over Dr. Hardy's more precautious approach. If highly quantitative dosimetric methods could "prove" that a certain amount of exposure was safe, then fewer shutdowns would hamper the production of materials as had occurred with mercury in 1948. Participants in contemporary debates in regulatory science will recognize radiation dosimetry here as a form of utilitarian calculus, a historical antecedent to the misuses of quantitative risk assessment in mollifying concern about a wide array of hazards.
Hardy's standards had been honed in a liberal milieu, influenced by her elder family members' Progressive Era politics. As a college student she had met Dr. Alice Hamilton, a leading reformer. By 1948 she was her junior author. Zwerling's 1987 chapter on "Salem Sarcoid" establishes a clear link between Harriet Hardy's pro-labor style and her family ties to the suffragette and peace movements and the legal profession [34] .
Hardy's last New Mexico diary entry on Thanksgiving Day 1948 had a poignant tone:
As I depart I have had a very touchingly large number of apparently genuine and spontaneous expressions of compliment "For what you have done," and regret at my leaving, amounting to an accusation of desertion.
She felt that workers' feelings of desertion originated in a "lack of leadership of my predecessors," specifically "a lack of warmth of physician-worker/patient relationship that stems from the statistically-textbook experimental: test tube kind of approach that has left my admissions feeling deserted . . ." [9] .
Decades would elapse, with many hazardous exposures incurred, before worker-centered advocates, informed by science-but not paralyzed by itwould effectively address the health concerns of Los Alamos workers in a climate of openness at the end of the 20th century, quite different from the one challenged by Harriet Hardy in 1948.
Appropriate care and diagnoses were afforded these few workers and a paucity of others over the past half century. Despite worker surveillance programs which serve a critical role in screening thousands of energy workers and contributing to compensation claims, particularly for the more clearly defined outcomes such as radiation induced malignancies and chronic beryllium disease, there remains a much larger group, spanning generations both past and present, of deserted workers, as Harriet Hardy recognized, whose exposures and permanent impacts will never be revealed. This is specifically true for those in work settings with complex chemical exposures such as the mercury case case who typically have no access to occupational health professionals outside of surveillance programs, absent a system to provide comprehensive protective medical evaluations. Such a system would not only provide the diagnoses and care workers deserve for the dangers they've faced, but would provide a much greater chance of taking preventive action to avoid the consequences of complex chemical exposures.
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